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Change in a 
Modern Prison 
Mr. Claridge, a third-year law student, is a member of 
the Danbury Prison Project of Yale Law School. Upon 
graduation he will become a staff attorney in the 
Criminal Appeals Bureau of the New York Legal Aid 
Society. 
In this essay Mr. Claridge attacks conventional 
rehabilitation programs, arguing that two crucial failings 
prevent successful treatment: 
1) failure to recognize the existence of an on-going 
inmate social system and its effects on rehabilitation 
efforts; 
2) the modern correctional ideology itself, which 
emphasizes professionalism as the central orientation of 
the staff He then describes and evaluates the new 
Narcotics Addict Rehabilitation Act program at 
Danbury suggesting that·its "therapeutic community" 
contains the beginnings of a working model which would 
overcome the weaknesses of standard corrections 
programs. 
Robert Claridge 
T he prison at Danbury, Connecticut, stands as one of the most progressive in the modern federal correctional system. White and 
scrubbed, it lies anchored in a rolling landscape. An 
observation tower just outside is the visitor's only hint 
that the sprawling structure he approaches is a prison 
and not a school, factory or corporate headquarters. He 
enters through electric sliding doors to the spacious 
prison compound whose athletic fields are bordered by 
administrative offices and by glove and cable factories. 
Lining the compound's perimeter on the left and right 
are dormitories named after nearby towns and states. To 
the front of the institution on the left are the individual 
locked cells that make up the "Intensive Treatment 
Unit" or "hole" that is used for disciplinary punishment. 
But medium security Danbury Federal Correctional 
Institution does not have the harsh atmosphere 
that often surrounds a maximum security institution. 
Since sentences at Danbury are relatively short, discipline 
is normally less than severe and there is variety in 
programs and personnel. Some of Danbury's approxi-
mately 700 inmates are serving the final months of 
sentences that began in higher security federal institu-
tions. Others have been assigned to the FCI to serve 
either short, fixed terms or sentences which are flexible 
and give a chance for early parole. Most inmates have 
been convicted of property crimes-ranging from car 
theft to bank robbery-or of drug offenses. 
No urgent need for radical reform at Danbury was 
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apparent in 1970. There was no inmate organization 
with a message of oppression at the prison. The press 
made no charges of officer brutality or of cruel and 
unusual prison conditions. Danbury was no San Quentin 
or Attica. 
In fact, Danbury has always operated well above the 
minimal standards of decency which American prison 
law is beginning to guarantee. Like other modern 
"correctional institutions," Danbury provides far more 
facilities and more professional personnel in the areas of 
education, vocational rehabilitation and psychological 
counseling than were available in older penitentiaries and 
reformatories. 1 Such variety in programs and "individu-
alization" in treatment have long been the pillars of 
progressive correctional theory. Since about 1920 the 
diversified and flexible prison has been likened to a 
"clinic" where each convict can be professionally 
diagnosed or classified and then programmed for the 
uniquely suitable combination of treatments that will 
lead to his rehabilitation.2 Twentieth Century correc-
tional institutions like Danbury are prisons where the 
most advanced treatment and rehabilitation of adult 
offenders is supposed to take place. 
Even though their conditions are more than minimally 
adequate, these institutions have been due for change of 
a different sort, for their rehabilitation efforts rest on an 
outworn theory. Penological theory has stressed the 
need for individualized as opposed to mass treatment of 
offenders for a century now. Corrections professionals 
usually attribute the failure of the theory to achieve 
desired results to a lack of sufficient numbers of 
qualified personnel. But the ideology of individual 
treatment based on individual differences its'"e"lf stands in 
the way of innovation and perhaps meaningful 
rehabilitation. Specifically, this professional correctional 
ideology does not come to grips with those interpersonal 
patterns of prison life which may block resocialization 
of the criminal, or even psychically scar him. Sociol-
ogists who have studied the change-over from a custodial 
to a treatment orientation in youth institutions have 
found greater permissiveness under the new treatment 
regimes, but no significant improvement in the patterns· 
of relationships among inmates, among staff members or 
between inmates and staff.3 Lloyd Ohlin has noted that 
even group therapy, which is oriented toward changing 
the personalities or attitudes of individual offenders, has 
been introduced into prisons without regard to its 
relation to the social context within which the therapy 
operates.4 
To repeat, it may well be that the failure of modern 
correctional systems to rehabilitate inmates is not 
merely a result of insufficient resources. Rather, it may 
be the underlying penological theory itself which is to 
blame for its neglect of the effects of the inmate social 
system. 
An incarcerated offender is typically confronted by a 
social system which consists of two sets of competing 
norms-those of straight society reflected in the values 
put forth by the prison administration and those of 
deviant society reflected in the inmate code. The code is 
more compelling because by obeying it the inmate can 
maximize his privileges and information and minimize 
violence to himself while safe-guarding his self-esteem.5 
The code's prime maxim is that the staff is not to be 
trusted and therefore the code's major commandment is 
never to divulge information about other inmates to 
staff members. Information should travel along the 
grapevine to inmates who are not staff trustees but 
should not cross the barrier between staff and inmates. 
A "rat" is a violator of the inmate imperative to silence. 
In one harsh custodial institution that has been studied:· 
... the atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion created by 
official secrecy and the fear of "rats" and, perhaps, the social 
characteristics of inmates prevented all but a minimum of 
cohesion and integration in the inmate social system. The only 
approach to a unifying goal that provided a focus for the inmate 
community was independence from official control and 
deliverance from the perils of arbitary, official action.' 
The code fosters a situation in which many inmates are 
interested in doing their own time with as little close 
personal interaction with staff or other inmates as 
possible. Thus, in one way the inmate code supports the 
smooth functioning of institutions by encouraging staff 
and inmates to play their respective roles, with neither 
trying to rock the boat. 
The goals of modern penology, however, are 
not achieved when inmates quietly do time and 
institutions simply function smoothly. Today 
the major justification for incarceration is inmate 
rehabilitation and not retribution or deterrence. 
Treatment programs such as vocational rehabilitation 
and psychological counseling may achieve some 
rehabilitation. For those few inmates who strongly 
desire to make significant changes in their own life-styles 
and identities while in prison,7 programmed activities 
may induce deviation from the inmate code as well as 
facilitate the acquisition of skills. Of course, the inmate's 
change during incarceration will be of no ultimate 
significance if the skills, credentials, and attitudes he 
acquired are impossible to apply outside the walls. 
The most commonly offered treatment programs 
rarely take sufficient account of the inmate code. They 
cannot be expected to alter significantly the behavior of 
the numerous class of inmates who do not wish to 
indulge in "self-improvement." Many of these "time-
doers" participate in activities with knowledge that such 
participation is a necessary step to quick release on 
parole.8 But they only go through the motions and treat 
therapy and education as a game. The fact that inmates 
play the game of rehabilitation while still conforming to 
the inmate code is frustrating to both staff and inmates. 
California correctional programs and administrative 
practices are aimed more direcdy at the inmate code. In 
what is commonly regarded as America's most advanced 
correctional system, inmate isolation vis-a-vis the staff is 
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eroded by: 1) the practice of transferring or administra-
tively segregating men who seem to have too much 
power and are seen as a threat to current prison policies 
and programs, 2) the indeterminate sentence, which 
serves as a very powerful control mechanism and thus 
makes it unnecessary to rely on Jess formal means of 
control, and 3) group counseling programs which 
weaken convict solidarity and encourage communication 
between inmates and staff.9 Penologist John Irwin 
reports that California inmates desire to present a 
favorable view of their individual progress in prison 
and/or remain largely inconspicuous to the prison 
administration.10 They are thus Jess aloof and distant 
from the treatment staff than the inmate code counsels 
them to be. 
Can these apparent inroads against the inmate code be 
correlated with success in ultimate rehabilitation? 
Students of California penology observe that as the 
variety and intensity of rehabilitative programming 
increases, recidivism rates do not decline.u Perhaps, 
then, the inmate code is not really being mitigated. 
Time-doers '!lay be dealing with the California system by 
increasing the subtlety of their role playing, or California 
inmates may be finding a new form of solidarity and 
isolation from the staff in radical politics. More likely, a 
very real reduction of the code may be creating new 
problems and barriers to rehabilitation. Time-doers seem 
to have an uncomfortable existence in the California 
prisons. Irwin quotes one inmate who feels out of place 
in the California system: 
As far as I'm concerned their main purpose has been in taking 
the convict code away from him. But what they fail to do is 
when they strip him from these rules is replace it with some-
thing. They turn these guys into a bunch of snivelers and they 
don't have any rules to live by. (Interview, Folsom Prison, July, 
1966)'2 
The increasing political activism in California prisons is 
evidence that inmates are angered as well as alienated by 
the highly manipulative indeterminate sentence. 13 When 
the dollar cost of California corrections is added to the 
alienation and wrath of its inmate population, that 
"progressive" system appears to be a failure. 
To summarize, the prevailing correctional ideology of 
individual treatment does not take sufficient account of 
the inmate code. And where modern correctional 
programs and administrative practices do inhibit the 
code, neither theory nor practice offers a more 
constructive substitute, leaving inmates empty and 
angry. 
Nor is the inmate code the only stumbling block to 
reform. The corrections staff has its own code-profes-
sionalism-which hinders efforts at rehabilitation in 
three ways. First, since professionalism involves a 
pre-existing tacit consensus upon goals, arguments are 
over means rather than ends. Discussion among 
corrections personnel is limited to problems of 
immediate inmate behavior. Sociologists Street, Vinter 
and Perrow report: 
In institutions where treatment-oriented cadres are dominant, 
the result is an emphasis on clinical processes, diagnostic 
refinements and the enhancement of professional skills. In time, 
these patterns can become self-validating. 14 
Second, the ideology of professionalism reinforces the 
split between professional doctors or correctors and 
inmate patients or subjects.·Third, corrections profes-
sionals tend to resist innovations which require greater 
effort or "threaten status or security, labelling them 
unprofessional. 
Professionalization of the staff can be one important 
means to insure orderly and decent prison administra-
tion. But in modern institutions like Danbury, profes-
sionalism can obstruct efforts to reduce the impact of 
the inmate code and to find constructive substitutes. 
Responding to the addiction crisis rather than to the 
Jess visible need for change in progressive correctional 
institutions, Congress passed a Narcotic Addict 
Rehabilitation Act (N{\RA) in 1966. The law stipulated 
that when a convicted offender was diagnosed to b.e an 
addict and likely to be rehabilitated through treatment, 
qe was to be specially sentenced under NARA. Special 
treatment to be given to the NARA inmate was defined 
only with the broadest outlines. Congress assigned 
primary responsibility to the United States Public Health 
Service for examining, treating and finally certifying 
addicts as having made progress. For although the 
legislators were not at all sure that addiction could be 
effectively treated, they did agree that addiction was a 
sickness and that psychiatrists and other medical 
personnel were best equipped to deal with it. 
That NARA would stimulate tremendous change at 
Danbury could not be predicted from a reading of the 
vague, medical-sounding law. 15 Myrl Alexander, Direct9r 
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, arguing for passage of 
the NARA, urged that it would provide new flexibility 
and opportunity to apply correctional treatment on the 
basis of addicts' individual needs. 16 This was not radical 
rhetoric since flexibility and individ.ual treatment have 
always been the goals of the Bureau of Prisons. In fact, 
the Danbury FCI of 1966 could claim to offer many of 
the services included within the treatment definition of 
the law. 
Danbury's first NARA program, lasting from 1968 
until 1970, simply required that NARA inmates attend 
semi-weekly sessions of group therapy led by a Public 
Health Service psychologist, psychiatrist or psychiatric 
social worker. With the mere addition of group therapy 
and personnel to conduct it, Danbury offered the kind 
of NARA program that Congress had authorized. 
The life of the NARA inmate was not fundamentally 
different from that of the regular, non-NARA inmate. 
Although NARA inmates lived together in pockets of 
each dormitory, they were spread around the entire 
institution. Many NARA inmates developed loyalties 
and interests outside the NARA program and came to 
regard their limited participation in therapy as a game. 
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After a few months of working with the group therapy 
p~ogram, Dr. Robert Rapkin, the U.S. Public Health 
Service psychiatrist who became Director of NARA in 
July 1969, found that: 
Inmate group, staff group, Public Health Service group, all 
cohere around certain labels and isolate themselves from each 
other. 17 
Dr. Rapkin was discovering that Danbury was plagued 
by the problems of modern prisons. 
Finding the group therapy program a failure and 
recognizing the need for change, Rapkin concluded, "To 
bridge the gaps between these existing groups was clearly 
the place to begin." 18 A program was needed that 
would change the whole social climate in which the 
inmate code flourished. 
Rapkin found a model for more effective treatment of 
addicts in Daytop, Inc., of Seymour, Connecticut. 
Daytop, Inc., is one of the East Coast descendants of the 
Synanon program developed in California in the early 
1960's. Elements of the Synanon-Daytop "concept" 
that Rapkin saw applied in Seymour may be enumerated 
as follows: 
1. Only ex-addicts have the expertise to help and 
rehabilitate current addicts. 
2. Professionals-doctors, psychiatrists, social workers, 
correctional officers-have only a limited role to play. In 
Synanon's early years, professionals were entirely 
excluded. Daytop gives professionals an important role 
in administering and safeguarding the program. But this 
professional sphere is strictly separate from the 
day-to-day treatment decisions which are the domain of 
ex-addicts. 
3. Addiction is not a disease and the addict is not sick. 
Rather, addiction is a symptom of a problem that 
plagues many members of American society. In fact, 
Daytop and Synanon claim to be suitable for non-
addicts as well as addicts. Although not sick, addicts are 
sometimes said to be children; addiction is a form of 
regression. 
4. Addicts need a tightly-knit family structure that will 
inculcate new values and provide support for rehabilita-
tion. 
5. This family is built on an authoritarian model. New 
members begin at the lowest level. Over time and with 
effort in clearly indicated directions, they move up to 
positions of increasing responsibility and power. A 
visitor entering Daytop in Seymour may hear a 
"coordinator," one of the most powerful "officers," 
order silence. Talk ceases immediately, for individual 
recalcitrance is dealt with by group verbal attacks and 
ostracism. Decision-making is not democratic: new 
Daytop leaders are appointed by present leaders. 
Daytop's chain of command is similar to that in military 
basic training except that the Daytop "officers" issuing 
orders are themselves recent recruits. Perhaps some of 
the enthusiasm that Daytop inspires may be compared 
with the pride of a soldier in his military unit. Coupled 
with pride in the group at Daytop is pride in self. 
Individual mobility along a ladder of job positions is 
encouraged. 
6. Daytop demands a great psychological investment 
from each participant. The program is not easy and it is 
presumed that not everyone can endure it. 19 
I n January 1970 convicts arriving for diagnosis at Danbury were told that they would have to participate in an altogether new program if they 
were sentenced to NARA. By March a separate 
dormitory, Danbury Hall, was set aside for NARA 
inmates. A contract was let for Daytop, Inc., to establish 
a program in Danbury Hall. The result was the now 
two-year-old NARA "therapeutic community." 
Danbury FCI was bifurcated by the establishment of 
the therapeutic community. The approximately 150 
NARA inmates are not only differently sentenced and 
released than are the approximately 500 regular inmates, 
but also live under a vastly different regime. The recent 
changes at Danbury are focused in one part of the 
institution which stands in radical contrast to the rest of 
the prison. 
There is reason to hypothesize that the NARA 
therapeutic community is an antidote for the correc-
tional problems described above. The effects of the 
inmate code are probably mitigated where authority is 
exercised by inmates and ex-addicts other than the staff. 
At Danbury NARA inmates are responsible for the 
day-to-day administration of the program. Their 
responsibilities include diagnosing prospective NARA 
inmates, orienting them to the program, assigning 
individuals to groups, scheduling group meetings and 
maintaining the discipline and upkeep of the therapeutic 
community. Inmate "coordinators," not Public Health 
Service psychiatric social workers, lead the groups. These 
coordinators meet weekly with the director, other 
members of the NARA staff and Daytop ex-addicts to 
discuss problems and policies. 
Inmate responsibility for day-to-day treatment is 
shared with the three Daytop, Inc., ex-addicts who work 
full time at Danbury under contract. Daytop personnel 
conducted the original training of both inmates and staff 
in the skills demanded by the therapeutic community. 
The ex-addicts have continued their training activities. In 
addition, during the daytime they share authority with 
the inmate coordinators and exercise veto power over 
treatment decisions. 
The white middle class professional staff of NARA is 
responsible for the overall administration ofNARA.20 
This staff is presently composed of two psychologists; 
four case workers whose background is psychiatric social 
work; eight correctional counsellors, some of whom used 
to be correctional officers, and the new director, John 
McCullough, a psychiatric social worker. Their tasks 
include setting broad policy, maintaining good relations 
with the courts, the Parole Board and the rest of the FCI 
and otherwise assuring the smooth operation of the 
program. In addition, the Public Health Service staff 
351 
4
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2 [1972], Iss. 4, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol2/iss4/4
352 
determines how much progress each inmate is making 
and has the sole authority for certifying inmates as 
eligible for parole. The NARA staff exercises more 
authority than does the regular institution staff in these 
important administrative areas. But the NARA staff has 
intervened less in the daily existence of the inmate.21 
Daytop philosophy both places limits on the day-to-day 
intervention of the professional staff and enhances the 
autonomy of inmates. In these ways it probably inhibits 
the growth of an anti-rehabilitative inmate code. 
Another way in which the therapeutic community 
may defeat the inmate code is by systematically 
reshaping the inmates' environment. Formal NARA 
group activity accounts, on the average, for twelve to 
fifteen hours per week of each inmate's time. This does 
not include the time in which NARA inmates interact 
less formally with each other simply because they live at 
close quarters. The thereapeutic community groups 
currently include the following: 
I. Regular groups 
- Encounter or hostility groups: Every inmate who 
has a complaint or negative feeling about another 
inmate or staff member is supposed to save it for 
these group meetings. One person at a time 
becomes the focus of hostility for the others. 
- Peer groups: The activities vary but peer groups 
are always composed of inmates who are at the 
same "behavior level." 
- Static groups: The membership of a static group 
is constant. Inmates discuss their personal 
problems. 
II. Special groups which meet less regularly 
- Data sessions: They may be used to teach such 
things as the structure of the NARA house and 
the chain of command. 
- Image-breaking seminars: Inmates act out roles of 
women and other roles which are contrary to the 
ones they are perceived as playing. 
- Educational seminars: Inmates may have to read 
in preparation and report on current events. 
- General meetings: Meetings of the whole house for 
discussion on an important matter. 
- Recreational seminars. 
- Morning meetings: to discuss the day's business. 
- Re-entry group and certification groups: for those 
inmates soon to be released. 
- House retreats: These occasional, intensive, 
house-wide discussions of a single topic may last 
for several days. 
The intensity of the groups and the severity of 
punishments in the therapeutic community are enough 
to stimulate full commitment to current activities. 
Punishments are administered by the NARA group. 
They include, in increasing degrees of seriousness, a 
"verbal reprimand," a "stern talking to," a "haircut" 
and a "general meeting." When one inmate is given a 
"haircut," he stands in front of a·group arranged in a 
horse-shoe. In the "abusive phase," group members yell 
at the offender as loud as they can. This is followed by 
the "patch-up" phase. Minding one's own business, the 
inmate code behavior which can protect an inmate in the 
regular institution, is precisely the behavior that draws 
these severe sanctions of the NARA therapeutic 
community. 
The NARA therapeutic community should be more 
effective than the non-NARA part of Danbury or even 
the California system in attacking the inmate code. 
Inmate leadership and full exposure can be expected to 
defeat the means by which time-doers maintain distance 
from their rehabilitators. Inmates residing in the NARA 
therapeutic community do indeed seem to be committed 
to the activities that go on there. 
It is more difficult, however, to predict how NARA 
inmates perform once they are released. Once the 
pressures and supports of the therapeutic community are 
removed, can the parolee continue to live a highly 
ordered and moralistic life-style? And even if the 
life-style inculcated in approximately fourteen months 
of NARA participation 22 does carry over into the street 
will this guarantee freedom from drugs and from crime? 
Post-release success or failure has not yet been ade-
quately evaluated. A national survey for several NARA 
institutions23 reported in 1970 that 72% of parolees 
from the NARA programs remained on the street. Since 
inmates just released were counted and there is little 
uniformity in the process of parole revocation, the 
importance of this figure is open to great doubt. Also, a 
parolee who resorts to methadone would be reflected as 
a success in this "remain on the street" statistic, but is a 
failure in terms of the Daytop, drug-free philosophy. 
John McCullough, Danbury's present NARA director, 
has calculated an approximate success rate of Danbury 
therapeutic community graduates since January of 1970. 
He considered any reported case of methadone use as a 
failure. McCullough's estimate was that 71% of 
therapeutic community parolees were still on the street 
and not on methadone, although he cautioned that he 
didn't have complete records of current behavior and 
that the parolees have not been on the street long 
enough to show a significant pattern. Of course one 
must discount this success rate by the possibility that 
any greater success in rehabilitation shown by the 
therapeutic community is the result of either the 
exclusion of difficult cases or the special regard which 
the NARA experiment enjoys. 
Evaluation is further complicated when the psycho-
logical cost of treatment is considered. Perhaps the 
inmate who is profoundly affected by the therapeutic 
community suffers in ways that are less measurable than 
rates of crimes and drug use. Even when the NARA 
parolee stays away from drugs and crime, it is possible 
that he pays for this abstinence. As illustrated by the 
earlier discussion of the California prison system, 
destruction of the inmate code may leave a psycho-
logical vacuum. Perhaps the therapeutic community's 
group cohesion provides a support that substitutes for 
the inmate code. But can a graduate of this therapeutic 
community safely continue to relate to street people the 
way he related to fellow NARA inmates? It is possible 
that the therapeutic community creates problems as well 
as solutions that are new to corrections. 
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When, on balance, NARA in found to be successful 
the causes should be ascertained-that is, the various 
facets of the therapeutic community must be correlated 
to the reported success. Is inmate autonomy the factor 
which is making the prison experience more constructive 
than destructive? Or is it the heavy group exposure or 
the discipline? 
If inmate leadership and autonomy proves to be 
valuable, how far can it be extended in the context of a 
prison? And if it is the total exposure and hierarchy that 
is succeeding, how far can a democratic society go in 
compelling such exposure? 
Can the therapeutic community be successful with all 
inmates? Or is there. something about the Day top 
methods that makes them more effective for addicts? 
Are addicts at Danbury a very different lot from the 
non-addicts? 
This essay will not attempt to answer these difficult 
questions. But it will try to analyse some of the ways 
NARA has developed at Danbury over the last two years 
to provide a basis for further evaluation and reform. 
W en the NARA program adopted the Daytop ethod of community therapy, it was running ounter to the precepts of modern correctional 
ideology which emphasize treatment of individual 
offenders by a professional staff. But, consistent with 
the language of the law, the directors of NARA have 
maintained an image of NARA as a medical treatment 
program which cures addicts, thus perserving its 
orthodox appearance even as it adopted radical new 
approaches. Supported by this image, the NARA 
program has gained increasing autonomy from the 
courts, the Parole Board and the rest of the institution in 
the areas of admissions, classification, discipline and 
release. At the same time, the tension created by the 
divergence between appearance and reality has created 
serious problems for NARA. 
Autonomy in the area of admissions has reached a 
point where only those offenders whom the NARA staff 
recommends for treatment are sentenced to NARA. By 
law, federal judges cannot sentence offenders to NARA 
without first considering the NARA staffs diagnosis 
made in a 30-day study period. This determines whether 
the inmate is an addict and "likely to be rehabilitated 
through treatment." If the judge accepts the NARA 
study-period finding that the addict is likely to be 
rehabilitated through treatment, he is legally required to 
sentence the offender to NARA. A staff diagnosis of 
"not likely to be rehabilitated through treatment" is 
typically based on the offender's bad attitude as 
displayed in the 30-day study period or on his having 
too short a sentence for adequate treatment. In the first 
years of NARA, judges occasionally disregarded negative 
staff diagnoses, found offenders likely to be rehabil-
itated and sentenced them to treatment. Now judges 
almost always follow the staff's findings. 
The unusually autonomous stance of NARA in the 
classification process can be appreciated only after 
Danbury's regular classification process is sketched. 
Classification involves acquiring as much information 
about the inmate as is available from his prior record and 
from his behavior in his first weeks at Danbury and 
making assignments with respect to dormitory, work and 
treatment programs. Decisions are based on the apparent 
needs of both the inmate and the institution. Classifica-
tion is usually done by a committee composed of the 
warden or assistant warden, the chief of classification 
and parole, and the heads of education, discipline and 
industry. This committee first classifies an inmate soon 
after he arrives at the FCI and may reclassify him later in 
his term. The social case-worker whose case is on the 
agenda informs the Classification Committee about the 
inmate's problems and prospects and may even make 
specific recommendations. Committee members discuss 
the case and come to decision in a matter of minutes.24 
The inmate thus classified typically has little influence 
over his assignments. He may express certain wishes in 
pre-classification interviews with his caseworker, and the 
caseworker may support the inmate's request in 
committee. But the caseworker does not represent the 
inmate who himself appears only after the decisions are 
rendered. And even where the caseworker does 
recommend what the inmate has asked for, he may well 
be overruled by the committee members. 
The appearance of the NARA inmate and caseworker 
before the Classification Committee is only pro forma. 
There is no decision to be made about living place or 
custody level. He must live in either one or the other of 
the NARA dorms, and the determination is made by the 
NARA staff. Any recommendation that the NARA staff 
has concerning an inmate's work assignment or 
treatment program is specifically reported to the 
Classification Committee and the committee follows it. 
The committee's only decisions concerning a NARA 
inmate are on those matters where the NARA staff 
expresses no preference. 
A similar deference is shown to the NARA unit in 
disciplinary matters. In the non-NARA portion of 
Danbury correctional officers report serious infractions 
of institutional rules to their supervisors who in turn are 
responsible for investigation. An average of 25 to 30 
disciplinary cases a week are referred to the Danbury 
Adjustment Committee, composed of the chief 
correctional supervisor, the supervisor of education, and 
the chief of classification and parole. The committee 
disposes of many of these referrals by withholding 
inmates' statutory good time and/or by committing 
them to the Intensive Rehabilitation Unit ("the hole") 
for punitive segregation. Since the creation of the 
therapeutic community in early 1970, only three or four 
NARA disciplinary cases have been reported to the 
Adjustment Committee.25 NARA inmates do commit 
infractions, of course, but these are normally dealt with 
in the therapeutic community without referral to the 
Adjustment Committee. 
Like the sentencing courts, the Classification 
Committee and the Adjustment Committee, the Parole 
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Board defers to the NARA staff in matters of prisoner 
release. When the NARA staff is satisfied that the inmate 
has spent enough time in the therapeutic community, it 
certifies to the Parole Board that the inmate has made 
sufficient progress to warrant his conditional release 
under supervision. Such certification is legally required 
before the Parole Board can release the inmate. 
Non-NARA caseworkers write parole progress reports 
when their inmates are due to go before the Parole 
Board. However, in contrast to the NARA certification, 
the non-NARA report does not always recommend 
actual release. And if release is requested, the Parole 
Board frequently denies the request. The wide discretion 
exercised by the Parole Board in regular cases is not 
exercised for NARA inmates. The practice of the Parole 
Board since the commencement of the therapeutic 
community has been to release an inmate on the heels of 
a staff certification. So in effect, the NARA staff alone 
determines the point in time between the minimum and 
maximum fixed by the court, when the offender will be 
released. 
T here are good reasons why NARA enjoys autonomy. In framing the enabling act Congress understood the treatment of addiction as a 
medical problem demanding treatment by psychologists 
and psychiatrists. The embryo of the medical image of 
the program was written into the act. Decisions 
concerning sentencing of addicts to the special treatment 
program and releasing addicts from the program become 
in this view not correctional but medical. The compe-
tence that judges, Parole Board members and regular 
prison officials can be said. to have in correctional and 
penal matters becomes, conceptually, inadequate. It is 
understandable that within .the framework of a medical 
program they would defer to the impressive staff of 
credential-bearing psychologists and psychiatrists 
Congress assembled to administer the act. Especially 
within the prison, the superior expertise and the superior 
status of the NARA staff create an aura of authority. 
Treatment officials see the NARA program as extensive 
counseling and psychotherapy and, therefore, tend to 
view themselves as incapable of evaluating it because 
their opinions, as one case worker put it, are "not that 
professional." 26 
Furthermore, the image of professional competence 
which was created by the 1966 law and enhanced by the 
NARA staff has important survival value for the NARA 
program. NARA is called on to justify all the ways in 
which it deviates from the non-NARA part of Danbury. 
One justification it offers is that the therapeutic 
community practice is no easier on inmates than is the 
corresponding non-NARA practice. While parole may be 
sooner, privileges which are occasionally available in 
Daytop are barred to the therapeutic community. But 
even though differences between NARA and non-NARA 
don't seem to result in favoritism for the NARA 
inmates, they must nonetheless be explained. It is easiest 
to gain acceptance and a certain degree of freedom to 
experiment for NARA by presenting it as a medical 
treatment program. 
However, maintaining this medical identity has several 
drawbacks. First, since NARA has been packaged as a 
natural extension of modern clinicaJ corrections, 
important aspects of the therapeutic community 
innovation at Danbury have been obscured. Students of 
American penology have not learned the degree to which 
Daytop renounces the principles of modern corrections. 
The Twentieth Century correctional ideology-long due 
for exposure, evaluation and, perhaps, rejection-stands 
intact. If Daytop, in whole or in part, is indeed an 
antidote for the problems of progressive institutions the 
real nature of the NARA program should surface. 
The medical image also locks Danbury NARA into 
one form of treatment. The current therapeutic 
community is regarded as the treatment program for 
addicts rather than as one step in the evolution of a 
treatment or as one of many possible programs. This 
perception retards needed experimentation and change. 
For example, some elements of the current therapeutic 
community might be expendable. Possibly, no one 
should be sentenced to NARA; rather NARA should be 
deliberately rendered more palatable than prison life, 
and all inmates should be allowed to opt in or out. And 
perhaps there should be a range of therapeutic commun-
ity regimes differing in their internal organization and in 
their ethnic compositions. Each inmate could be allowed 
to choose the NARA house to which he will commit 
himself. We will never know how NARA should evolve 
until the present program is looked at apart from the 
medical identity with which it is currently garbed. 
There :ire indeed grounds for believing that the 
program has been artificially limited by its medical 
image. Daytop principles can probably be applied to 
other prison groups. Soon after Synanon was created to 
deal with the problems of addicts, it was applied to 
non-addicts as well. In 1962 the Nevada State Prison 
experimented with a Synanon program, although the 
population contained only a small percentage of addicts. 
Dr. Rapkin knows of the Nevada State experiment and 
sees no reason why the therapeutic community program 
should be relevant only to addict offenders. However, 
the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act would blunt any 
NARA staff initiative. to treat non-addicts. The 
contradiction between the narrow restriction in the law 
and the broad possibilities of the current program is 
accented in a pending legal case. Committed to Danbury 
NARA in 1968, an inmate was conditionally released in 
1969 after the NARA staff had certified him as having 
made "sufficient progress" in group therapy. Four 
months after the release he was brought back to 
Danbury on a parole violation. This was not due to any 
new use of drugs but rather to his conviction and short 
detention in the District of Columbia for the crime of 
"lewd and immoral purposes." Back at Danbury he has 
been told that if he does not go in to the therapeutic 
community, he will sacrifice his chance for early 
re-parole. The staff tells him that his lawbreaking on 
parole is evidence that he needs more NARA rehabilita-
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tion. Indeed, the 1966 law defined treatment to include 
that which would correct anti-social tendencies. But 
only the anti-social tendencies of addicts were to be 
treated. The inmate claims that since NARA is only for 
addicts and he was cured of his addiction, he no longer 
has a need to participate. His claim is legitimate if 
NARA is understood narrowly. Since the NARA staff 
has not recommended changes in the act to bring it 
closer to therapeutic community reality, it cannot be 
surprised when such a legal claim arises. 
Still more serious problems arise when the NARA 
administration regards the medical image that it sustains 
and creates as reality. This seems to have happened in 
one of the first NARA cases to be handled by the 
Danbury Project of the Yale Law School Legal Services 
Organization. Just after the inmate was committed to 
Danbury for NARA, he was found to have a heart 
condition that demanded immediate medical attention. 
Although he wanted. to start the NARA group therapy 
program immediately, he was transferred to Atlanta for 
diagnosis and open heart surgery. When returned to 
Danbury, the inmate had already served 14 months, 
which is as much time as most NARA inmates spend in 
prison. He claimed that he had been cured by his 14 
drug-free months in the federal correctional system. 
Moreover, his heart surgeon had warned him that if he 
ever again shot heroin, he would die. The NARA staff 
insisted that his real treatment would begin only when 
he entered the new therapeutic community. After 
sampling the new program, the inmate refused to stay 
there and, as a result, was paroled to a halfway house 
only shortly before his maximum release date. The 
inmate should have been given credit for his 14 months, 
discounted by some measure of the degree to which his 
experience was less valuable than NARA treatment 
might have been. But the NARA staff long refused to 
certify him as having made "sufficient progress to 
warrant his conditional release under supervision." The 
NARA staff chose to assume that the 14 months served 
in the federal correctional system had been entirely 
without value in curing addiction. 
NARA's belief in its own medical image carries 
dangers that transcend the individual case. If we believe 
that any beneficial impact of the therapeutic community 
can be attributed solely to its total exposure aspect, then 
there may be no cause for worry. A treatment staff 
assured of its own special competence will be most 
capable of manipulating inmates for maximum control 
and exposure. However, effective exposure may depend 
more on inmate leadership than on staff manipulation. 
And the therapeutic community's best hope for 
corrections may well lie in its tendency to make inmates 
more autonomous from the staff and those who have 
risen in rank more equal in status to the staff. The 
present intensity of group interaction and rigidity of 
command structure would probably produce more 
disaffection if the white middle class staff took a more 
direct role in the internal workings of the therapeutic 
community or treated NARA inmates as prisoner-
patients without rights. Yet this is the direction in which 
the distorted self-image of NARA staff members pulls. 
For if the NARA psychologists, caseworkers and 
correctional counselors are regarded and regard 
themselves as clinicians, it is hard for them to limit their 
role to administration and leave treatment to inmates 
and ex-addicts. As the staff gains power and prestige 
vis-a-vis the courts, the Parole Board and the rest of the 
institution, its impulse is to exert its authority within 
the NARA dorms. And having adopted a professional 
treatment role to gain this authority, the staff may have 
difficulty shedding this role to deal as equal with 
inmates. 
Recent events at Danbury lend substance to these 
fears. The balance of power between staff, Daytop, 
ex-addicts and inmates 27 has been altered by the new 
NARA director. A co-directorship, consisting of Public 
Health Service psychologist and a Daytop ex-addict, now 
operates in each of the two houses. The co-directorship 
exercises all the veto power over treatment decisions 
formerly exercised by the ex-addicts alone. In the words 
of the current director, John McCullough, the co-direct-
orship has: 
... the ultimate responsibility and veto power over everything 
that occurs in the house. Although the inmates still make the 
same decisions as before, there is more review of the decisions, 
and some decisions (e.g., whether to put a man out of the 
program) are entirely up to the Co-Directorship. 28 
Another recent change is to allow NARA caseworkers 
and correctional counselors to run about one-fifth of the 
groups.29 McCullough's reasons for the changes were to 
encourage "staff involvement," to prepare for the time 
when Daytop ex-addicts can be phased out and to 
confront inmates with more "authority they can relate 
with." Although McCullough told me that he cleared the 
change in advance with Daytop in Seymour, Connecti-
cut, and "they thought it was a great idea," it is hard to 
see the change as a step in the direction of the Daytop 
"addict-treat-addict" principle. 
T he evolution of NARA has been both helped and hindered by Congress' assumption that addiction is a problem for medical personnel 
and by the high value that correctional officials place on 
"clinical" and professional programs. In broadly defining 
treatment, Congress delegated to the NARA treatment 
staff the task of developing specific programs. Since 
outsiders are satisfied that Danbury's NARA officials are 
running a particularly professional and clinical program, 
these officials have found unusual freedom to innovate. 
But at the same time, the Dayfop innovation has had to 
be restricted and distorted to fit the assumptions of the 
politicians, judges and correctional officials. The 1966 
law, while flexible, has also produced distortions in the 
NARA program. It is to the legal problems that we now 
turn. 
Before a judge can sentence an offender to NARA, he 
is required by the 1966 law to send the convict to the 
Bureau of Prisons for a 30-day examination to determine 
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whether he is an addict and likely to be rehabilitated 
through treatment. The implication of the sentencing 
provision is that an addict can be sentenced to treatment 
against his will if this compulsory treatment is likely to 
insure his rehabilitation. In the therapeutic community, 
however, no inmate has been diagnosed as likely to be 
rehabilitated through treatment unless he has preferred 
NARA to a regular sentence. Since March 1970 the 
examination period has consisted of an orientation by 
current participants in the therapeutic community which 
includes exposure to some facets of the NARA regimen. 
Shortly after the orientation and exposure, offenders are 
asked whether they want to "contract" for the NARA 
program. A decision to contract is translated into a staff 
finding for the court that the inmate is likely to be 
rehabilitated through treatment. Almost invariably the 
court adopts this finding and sentences the inmate to 
NARA. 
Giving study cases the choice whether or not to 
contract for NARA was a movement in the direction of 
Daytop and away from the medical formalism of the 
treatment law. To be admitted to Daytop in Seymour an 
applicant must go through an elaborate "investment" 
procedure which involves exercises in which he proves to 
house members that he truly wants to be rehabilitated. 
As with Daytop "investment," the NARA study-period 
is designed to select offenders who are favorably 
disposed to the therapeutic community. The therapeutic 
community regimen is intense, and someone not ready 
for it from the start is not very likely to complete the 
program. The most effective way to make this selection 
is to give the offenders a choice that was not provided 
by the law. About 60 per cent of NARA study cases 
reject the contract, are diagnosed as not likely to be 
rehabilitated through treatment and are regularly 
sentenced. 
Neither Daytop investment nor the Danbury 
"contract" is purely voluntary. Many applicants to 
Daytop have had their sentences suspended on the 
condition that they enter Daytop. Others have been 
paroled early from Connecticut institutions in order to 
commit themselves to Daytop. If these offenders do not 
go through with the program, their probation or parole 
may be revoked. The typical Danbury study-case has 
even more time-pressure to contract for NARA. lfhe 
does not contract, he will be sentenced to a 5 or l 0 
year term. 30 Offenders who expect to get regular 
sentences shorter than 5 or IO years generally reject 
NARA. Study cases who do contract do so primarily to 
avoid long sentences.31 
The NARA contract is a commitment by the inmate 
to spend his Danbury sentence in the NARA dorms. He 
understands tliat if he refuses to live in the therapeutic 
community after contracting, he will have to serve to his 
maximum release date-the date on which the institution 
is legally required to release the offender. The uncooper-
ative NARA inmate thus foregoes all chance for parole. 
The Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act stipulates that 
NARA commitment shall be for "an indeterminate 
period of time not to exceed ten years, but in no event 
shall it exceed--the sentence that could otherwise have 
been imposed." But actually the NARA inmate may 
serve more time than he would have served under a 
regular sentence. An addict convicted of a ten year 
offense may opt for NARA in the expectation of serving 
only 14 months. As provided by the law, his NARA 
sentence can be no longer than IO years. If he chooses 
the regular sentence he will have a good chance of 
parole, provided he doesn't have too many prior 
convictions and his institutional record is all right. But if 
he contracts for NARA and then does not participate he 
will certainly serve at least 6 years and 8 months, 
the "mandatory release date" under a l 0-year federal 
sentence.32 
Once an offender commits himself to NARA, the 
choice element disappears. The staff frankly describes 
the study period as the time in which an inmate can 
make a calculation based on time to be served. But after 
commitment the staff changes its tune. The inmate who 
stops participating in NARA is not making a legitimate 
choice; at this point, he is refusing treatment. If the 
inmate claims that he has already served as much time as 
he would have under a regular sentence, the staff 
responds that time is irrelevant to NARA treatment. In 
other words, the post-commitment NARA inmate 
should not even be thinking about time. When an inmate 
alleges that he was undergoing too much stress in the 
therapeutic community, the staff usually responds that 
he can complete treatment but just doesn't want to. 
Director McCullough reports that there has been a slight 
shift of policy since December, 1971. When the staff 
determines that NARA dropouts: 
... cannot emotionally make it through the therapeutic 
communities, we will offer them a second avenue to reparole 
through a new treatment program. This will, however, affect a 
small amount of inmates. 33 
Under this policy, a homosexual who left the NARA 
dorms because his homosexuality was being viewed as a 
problem to be treated might be rechanneled to 
individual counseling. So might a staff-diagnosed 
psychotic. But these decisions to exempt inmates from 
the requirement of therapeutic community participation 
are made only by staff and are very rare. In not 
providing a re-sentencing mechanism, Congress seems to 
have assumed, "Once an addict and likely to be 
rehabilitated through treatment, always one." An 
amendment to provide staff inititated resentencing 
might enable more inmates to convince the staff that 
NARA was no longer suitable for them. But it seems 
simpler and more reasonable to allow the addict 
offender to leave NARA with some sacrifice of the time 
advantage he would have enjoyed by completing the 
program. This would be more akin to Daytop where 
defection from the program does not usually result in a 
stiff time penalty. 
Despite the heavy time penalties for refusing NARA 
treatment, there have always been 25 to 40 resistors to 
the therapeutic community. These NARA sentenced 
inmates live in regular dormitories and have nothing to 
do with the program. The majority of these men were 
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sentenced to NARA when the program consisted only of 
semi-weekly group therapy. When the therapeutic 
community was instituted, those inmates who had spent 
considerable time in group therapy were allowed to seek 
parole by continuing individual or group counseling. 
Some inmates rejected this opportunity, refused to have 
anything further to do with NARA and so "maxed out" 
(served their maximum). A larger group of resistors were 
those inmates who were paroled under the old program 
and returned to Danbury after the new program had 
been created. The staff reasoned that since these 
parolees had broken their parole "contract" by violating, 
they should not be given the right to reject the new 
program. There are also inmates who chose to contract 
for NARA and then refused to participate. 
One explanation for the resistance of the present, 
contracting inmate is that he is surprised by what the 
program is like or by his own inability to cope with it. 
The NARA staff makes an effort to limif this surprise by 
exposing study cases to some of the therapeutic 
community. Where the inmate later perceives this 
program as oppressive brain washing, his study-period 
exposure may not have been complete enough. Second, 
in selecting out offenders who have a lot of time 
pressure, the contract admissions arrangement may leave 
the program with inmates who have nothing to lose by 
contracting and then resisting. Finally, new NARA 
inmates may be affected by the inmates who are already 
resisting. The latter seem to comprise an inmate culture 
with strong bonds of fellowship and common goals. 
There is an iR1mediate need to amend the Narcotic 
Addict Rehabilitation Act to mitigate the plight of 
NARA inmates who refuse treatment. The NARA staff 
argues that time pressure is necessary to insure that 
inmates will contract for the therapeutic community and 
to provide them with initial motivation which the 
program itself furnishes later. Even if this pressure is 
accepted as legitimate and necessary for rehabilitation, 
there are several reasons why a five-year penalty for 
withdrawing from the NARA dorms is excessive. First, 
the length of that penalty has been a random develop-
ment of legal history rather than a careful adjustment of 
the legal system to the particular needs of the thera-
peutic community. Next, the Congressional intent in 
1966 was to provide a short period of institutional care 
followed by lengthy aftercare on parole.34 This policy is 
frustrated when inmates are required to spend six years 
and eight months at Danbury. Presenting the 1966 bill 
to Congress, Attorney General Katzenbach noted that 
the lengthy indeterminate NARA sentence could be used 
to keep "recalcitrant" NARA inmates incarcerated. 35 
But surely his definition of "recalcitrance" would not be 
satisfied by mere refusal to go through the therapeutic 
community, unaccompanied by disruptive behavior. 
Finally, the existence of a large resistor population is 
evidence that the time penalty is far from fully effective 
in keeping inmates committed. The wasted years spent 
by the non-participating inmates must be counted as a 
cost of the present contract system. And, since the man 
who graduates from the therapeutic community may 
have contracted and stayed in NARA only to make time, 
he may be either insufficiently affected by NARA or 
harmed by the program. 
The time pressure to stay in the therapeutic com-
munity should at least be scaled down by putting a limit 
on the penalty for withdrawal. No NARA sentenced 
inmate should be compelled to stay at Danbury longer 
than the mandatory release date for a five year sentence. 
A ten year sentence inmate who refused to participate 
in NARA after contracting for it would thus be released 
after approximately four years instead of the current six 
years and eight months. Judges should not sentence any 
offenders to NARA who they feel should not be on the 
street within four years. Under this revision, the only 
difference between a five year sentence and one of ten 
years is that the latter would authorize a longer period 
of parole aftercare. 
T he Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act and the therapeutic community program deserve careful evaluation and perhaps broad revision. Even if 
the therapeutic community seems to pioneer solutions 
for modern correctional problems, this does not warrant 
uncritical support for the current program and its legal 
structure. The correctional benefits which we might reap 
from a Daytop-like program may be unrealized or only 
partly realized in the present arrangement. Indeed, at 
present the therapeutic community's administrative 
problems are easier to document than any successes it 
has had. 
Congress, the Bureau of Prisons, and the FCI 
administration would probably prefer to see the 
therapeutic community continue in its present posture, 
since Daytop principles have been applied to Danbury in 
a form that is acceptable to these institutions. The 
medical identity of the "therapeutic community," 
suggested even by the name, appeals to the corrections 
ideology of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and to 
Congress' medical concept of addiction treatment. 
Judges also tend to regard NARA as enlightened 
treatment without really focusing on the program or on 
the inmate problems it generates. The intensity and 
severity of the Danbury program permit corrections 
officials to accept it as an equivalent alternative to 
prison life. Parole Board, Classification Committee and 
Adjustment Committee all have ceded power to NARA 
treatment experts while retaining formal authority. The 
therapeutic community is now a legitimate entity within 
the prison and seems secure against major change. 
Congress and the Federal Bureau of Prisons must not 
blindly accept the current therapeutic community. 
There are two dangers here. First, by perceiving the 
program solely as medical treatment for addicts, 
government officials ignore the potential significance for 
corrections which the program presents. NARA is 
labeled, put in its place, and tl~e rest of the institution 
goes on as before. Non-addicts are needlessly excluded 
from the therapeutic community. At the same time, the 
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ongoing program is highly resistant to potential 
improvements. As we have seen, the potential for 
correctional benefits from the therapeutic community 
lies in the inmate autonomy it permits and/or the total 
exposure to the environment it forces. Evaluators should 
try to discover which of these elements is succeeding and 
which is failing. The intensity of exposure makes inmate 
autonomy politically acceptable. But this unusual 
autonomy may also be necessary if inmates are to 
tolerate the total exposure. However, the present 
balance between exposure and autonomy may not be 
the best. Perhaps inmate autonomy should be increased 
and the hierarchical nature of the therapeutic commun-
ity altered; or the current amount of hierarchy and 
exposure might be increased while inmate power is cut. 
In any event, the program now seems to be moving away 
from inmate autonomy, absent any evidence that this is 
the element least worthy of protection and expansion. 
A second danger of blindly accepting the present 
arrangement at Danbury is that vices will be permitted in 
the name of treatment. The therapeutic community is a 
very powerful instrument of social control. Intense 
pressure within the NARA dorm is supplemented by the 
threat of long time penalties for withdrawal. The NARA 
staff has more discretion than is normally exercised by 
correctional officials. If entirely unreviewed, this power 
may be abused. 
The only safe way to proceed with a program so new 
to corrections and so hard to understand is to strip it of 
its distorting images. We must view it apart from its legal 
origins which suggest that it is a medical treatment 
program for addicts, one separate from correctional 
history and ideology, lest we perceive it as the utmost in 
clinical corrections. The therapeutic community must be 
observed to determine its effects on inmates and the 
institution. Only then can it be defined without 
distortion and policy intelligently set. 
Becoming conscious of the distorting images and 
setting them aside, we can begin to make accurate 
statements about the nature of the therapeutic 
community. This is a society of enforced interaction and 
little.privacy. Inmates are given more status, power and 
autonomy than is customary in corrections. The inmate 
who rises through the hierarchy will come to exercise 
important responsibilities. Those who do not climb may 
benefit by being ruled by inmates rather than staff. 
With a clear perspective on the current law and 
358 program, we can begin to suggest broad changes. Since 
the therapeutic community can be applied to non-
addicts, the restriction to addicts in the law's examina-
tion and commitment provisions can be deleted. 
Diagnosis for addiction should be retained only if 
Congress determines, as a matter of priorities, that only 
addicts are to be treated. The need for other changes will 
be apparent when the specific elements of the thera-
peutic community are separately evaluated. Those 
aspects of the current NARA that seem very anti-civil 
libertarian and extremely demanding of inmates should 
be held to a high standard of proof of their efficiency. If 
the hierarchy and the exposure are not constructive, 
they should be moderated or abandoned. The following 
is the kind of broad change in law and program which 
might appear suitable if evaluators concluded that 
inmate autonomy is the principal source of rehabilita-
tion: First, scuttle the whole legal framework of 
sentencing to treatment. Send addicts to Danbury along 
with non-addicts by means of regular time sentences. 
Once at Danbury let each inmate have a chance to 
contract into a therapeutic community. Make it clear to 
him that he stands to gain a specified amount of time off 
his parole date or his maximum sentence (e.g., 1.2 days 
of regular time for every one day of participation) and 
some new institutional freedoms by joining a com-
munity. But in exchange he will become responsible to 
the group for cleanliness and discipline and will be called 
on to reveal something of himself in group sessions. The 
inmate should be permitted to enter a therapeutic 
community at any time during his first year at Danbury. 
If he withdraws after sentencing, he should be allowed 
one chance to rejoin at a later time but on1y within the 
first two years of sentence. 
Whether or not such changes are made, the govern-
ment cannot afford to set up a program like the 
therapeutic commµnity and then let it evolve willy-nilly. 
NARA is having complex effects on Danbury; some 
inmates are being hurt by the program and others 
helped. Congress and the Bureau of Prisons must 
attempt to evaluate the benefits and costs of the existing 
program. Blindly evolving, NARA's impact on Danbury 
would be destructive. And NARA's potential for 
improving modern prisons would be lost. 
11
Claridge: Change in a Modern Prison
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1972
1. The penitentiary was born in the United States in the early 
nineteenth century. The first reformatory for youthful offenders 
was opened at Elmira, N.Y. in 1876. Many of these nineteenth 
century institutions are still in use. It is now common for 
penitentiaries and reformatories constructed in both this and the 
last century to be renamed "correctional institutions" despite 
little or no improvement in program. When the term "correc-
tional institution" is used in this article, it refers to Twentieth 
Century adult institutions which are designed for or oriented 
more toward clinical treatment than custody. 
2. Another argument for diversity has been the alleged need to 
maximize the choices and responsibilities demanded of each 
inmate. Choice within prison is said to contribute to the ability 
to cope with outside society. Inmate choice and power were the 
guiding precepts of the well-publicized prison self-government 
movement in the second decade of this century. But as 
corrections became professionalized in the 1930's rehabilitation 
theory shifted from choice for inmates to clinical treatment of 
inmates for its justification. The theme of inmate autonomy is a 
minor one in the current journals of correction. 
3. D. Street, Robert I>. Vinter and C. Perrow, Organization for 
Treatment (N.Y., 1961). 
4. L. E. Ohlin, Targets for Change in Co"ectional Institutions, 
in Proceedings of the Saratoga Conference on Mobilizing 
Resources Toward the Rehabilitation of the Offender (March, 
1963), cited in M. S. Richmond, Prison Profiles 130-131 (Dobbs 
Ferry, 1965). 
5. S. Wheeler, Role Conflict in Co"ectional Communities in 
D. R. Cressey, The Prison Profiles 130-131 (Dobbs Ferry, 1965). 
6. R. H. McCleery, The Governmental Process and Informal 
Social Control 164 in Cressey, supra. 
7. Irwin has termed such desires "gleaning" and the inmates 
who have them "gleaners." J. Irwin, The Felon 68 (1970). 
8. Irwin at 68-74. 
9. Irwin at 66. 
10. Irwin at 65. 
11.J. Milford, Kind and Usual Punishment in California in 
Atlantic 45-52 (227 :March, 1971). R. Martinson, The Paradox 
of Prison Reform in N1iw Republic April 1, April 8, April 15, 
April 23 (1972). 
12. Irwin at 72. 
13. Criminologist R. l\Iartinson has recently argued that 
California's failure to reduce recidivism can be traced to 
increasing amounts of time served by California inmates. 
According to Martinson, deprivation of liberty, no matter what 
the treatment ends, is a self-defeating measure in a modern 
industrial economy. Group sessions have broken down barriers 
between California staff and inmates. But this progress is more 
than overcome by the California system's interference with life 
cycle progress of young adults by lengthy incarceration. 
R. Martinson, The Paradox of Prison Reform, in New Republic 
April 1, April 8, April 15, April 22 (1972). 
14. D. Street, Robert D. Vintor, C. Perrow, Organization for 
Treatment 13-14 (1966). 
15. The following are those sections of the law that are most 
relevant for the discussion here. 
18 U.S.C. § 4251 Definitions: 
(c) 'Treatment' includes confinement and treatment in an 
institution and under supervised aftercare in the community 
and includes, but is not limited to, medical, educational, 
social, psychological and vocational services, corrective and 
preventive guidance and training, and other rehabilitative 
services designed to protect the public and benefit the 
addict by correcting his antisocial tendencies and ending his 
dependence on addicting drugs and his susceptibility to 
addiction 
(f) defines "eligible offender" to include any offender 
except one currently convicted of a crime specified in this 
section or one who has the type of past criminal record also 
specified in this section. 
§ 4252 Examinations 
If the court believes that an eligible offender is an addict, 
it may place him in the custody of the. Attorney General for 
an examination to determine whether he is an addict and is 
likely to be rehabilitated through treatment. The Attorney 
General shall report to the court within 30 days, or any 
additional period granted by the court, the results of such 
examination and make any recommendations he deems 
desirable. An offender shall receive full credit toward the 
service of his sentence for any time spent in custody for an 
examination. 
§ 4253 Commitment 
(a) Following the examination provided for in Section 
4252, if the court determines that an eligible offender is an 
addict and likely to be rehabilitated through treatment, it 
shall commit him to the custody of the Attorney General 
for treatment .... Such commitment shall be for an 
indeterminate period of time not to exceed ten years, but in 
no event shall exceed the maximum sentence that would 
otherwise have been imposed. 
(b) If, following the examination ... , the court 
determines that an eligible offender is not an addict, or is an 
addict not likely to be rehabilitated through treatment, it 
shall impose such other sentence as may be authorized or 
required by law. 
§ 4254 Conditional Release 
An offender committed under Section 4253(a) may not 
be conditionally released until he has been treated for six 
months following such commitment in an institution 
maintained or approved by the Attorney General for such 
treatment. The Attorney General may than or at any time 
there after report to the Boards of Parole whether the 
offender should be conditionally released under supervision. 
After receipt of the Attorney General's report, and 
certification from Surgeon General of the Public Health 
Service that the offender has made sufficient progress to 
warrant his conditional release under supervision, the Board 
may in its discretion order such a release .... 
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1486, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 4253 
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17. R. M. Rapkin, M.D., The NARA Unit at Danbury: A Short 
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Journal of Corrections V. 33 (April, 1971). 
18. Id. 
19. A good source on Synanon is Lewis Yablonsky, Synanon: 
The Tunnel Back (1965). 
20. In contrast, the program's inmates are approximately 
ninety-five per cent non-white, there were thirty-two Puerto 
Ricans at recent count. A large percentage of the NARA inmates 
were convicted in the District of Columbia. 
21. The staff has recently increased its intervention. See below. 
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(Mich.), Alderson, (W.Va., women). Only Danbury's program is 
based on Daytop. These 1970 statistics cannot reflect the 
performance of the therapeutic community. 
24. Within Danbury, the discipline and industry departments 
can be roughly described as having a custody function-that is, 
keeping order and meeting the basic operational needs of this 
and other federal institutions. Counseling, education, classifica-
tion and parole, and the chaplain, are more closely related to 
correctional treatment. At classification, the representative of 
discipline is more likely to stress the need for firmness or the 
institutional need, while the inmate's caseworker or the head of 
one of the "treating" departments will plead for leniency and 
the filling of individual need. Although there is much variation 
from case to case, discussion of proposed assignments often 
starts with some division between "hard" and "soft" alterna-
tives, and with each department taking a consistently hard or 
soft position. Yet the division between the staff oriented toward 
treatment and the staff concerned primarily with custody does_ 
not seem deep at Danbury. In the classification I observed (July, 
1970) there was some conflict of roles, particularly at the outset 
of discussion, but no real battles between treaters and keepers. 
Inmates are simultaneously classified for security and treatment 
needs. Since the criteria for "treatability" are similar to those for 
custody ranking, an inmate who needs only light security will 
more likely assigned to special programs than will one who seems 
to be a troublemaker. There is often consensus in committee as 
to who is treatable and who is a troublemaker. And where the 
initial recommendation of the caseworker differs from that of 
the Chief Correctional Supervisor (head of discipline), there is 
soon a compromise decision. If classification requires patterned 
role playing, it also demands that each staff member be to some 
degree concerned with custody and to some degree concerned 
with treatment. Note that all staff are given treatment-sounding 
titles to enhance their status and mitigate potential conflict 
between treatment and custody po in ts of view. 
25. Interview with Chief Correctional Supervisor, March, 1971. 
Even in these rare cases, a NARA staff member has appeared 
before the committee to argue that the offender should be 
disciplined within the NARA dorm. 
26. Interview, Feb., 1971. 
27. See above. 
28. Letter from J. McCullough, NARA Director to the author in 
response to earlier draft of this article (Feb. 9, 1972). 
29. Id. 
30. About eighty per cent of the NARA sentences are for six 
months to ten years. Ten to fifteen per cent are for six months 
to three years. The balance are greater than "six months to three 
years" and less than "six months to ten years." 
31. Conversations with Dr. Robert Rapkin. 
360 32. Mandatory releasees are those prisoners who have served 
their sentences less credit for good behavior. 18 U.S.C. § 4161 
provides: 
Each prisoner ... whose record of conduct shows that he 
has faithfully observed all the rules and has not been 
subjected to punishment, shall be entitled to deduction 
from the term of his sentence beginning with the day on 
which the sentence commences to run, as follows: 
... Eight days for each month, if the sentence is ten years 
or more. When a prisoner has served his term, less good time 
deductions, his release is mandatory and he is deemed on 
parole until expiration of the maximum term (ten years), 
less one hundred and eighty days. Inmates may forfeit 
monthly good time for rule infractions and thus be released 
later than six years and eight months. 
33. Letter from J. McCullough, Feb. 9, 1972. 
34. Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act, House Report No. 
1486, in U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News 
4254 (1966). 
35. Statement of Attorney General Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, 
in Civil Commitment and Treatment of Narcotic Addicts 81 
Subcomm. No. 2 Comm. Jud. 89th Congress, lst and 2nd Sess. 
(Washington, 1966). 
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